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The Relation between Social Responsibility and Exit Performance of VC-Backed 
Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
Abstract 
This study analyzes the probability of successful exit by venture capital (VC)-backed en-
trepreneurial firms that focus on “clean energy” initiatives. Such initiatives include generation 
from renewable sources as well as conservation. The empirical analysis, for ventures between 1990 
and 2014, documents that clean energy investments have a higher probability of successful exit 
than do non-clean energy ventures. In addition, the results show that both solar and alternative 
energy VC-backed entrepreneurial firms allow their investors a shorter duration to exit. 
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The Relation between Social Responsibility and Exit Performance of VC-Backed 
Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
An enormous body of literature has emerged concerning corporate social responsibility and 
corporate financial performance, but there has not been sufficient research concerning socially 
responsible investing and new venture performance. In studying this concept, the greatest dilemma 
arises in trying to measure it. There is no universally accepted measure of social responsibility, 
forcing researchers to create their own. In this study, a venture capital (VC)-backed entrepreneurial 
firm is classified as “socially responsible” if it operates in the clean-energy industry.  
It is common for venture capitalists to be hesitant about clean energy ventures because of proven 
difficulties in producing a financial return by achieving a successful exit. If investors were given 
evidence that clean energy ventures can be successful, awareness for socially responsible practices 
would heighten. It is important that society not ignore the changing environmental, economic, and 
social conditions that are taking place. Opening the eyes of venture funds to entrepreneurial ven-
tures that are beneficial to these societal changes can have a profound impact. 
The 2015 New York State Energy Plan mandated that all New York companies reduce their 
carbon emissions 40 percent by 2030. Through this regulation, social responsibility is becoming 
an obligation of firms rather than a choice. Firms are going to have to start incorporating social 
practices into their business models as they would any other economic or financial practice. In the 
face of climate change, investing in the research and development of clean energy is one of the 
most impactful steps society can take in curbing global warming. However, evidence shows that 
“doing good” does not always come at a cheap price. A Wall Street Journal survey (2008) found 
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that 85 percent of U.S. investors and developers would increase business allocations to social prac-
tices if it met their risk and return criteria. In other words, hesitation to invest in a socially respon-
sible way stems from the perception that the return/risk proposition is not beneficial. But this ques-
tion has not yet been studied empirically for new ventures, a gap that this paper attempts to fill. 
Literature Review 
The concept of social responsibility is relatively new, and not sufficiently researched in the 
venture capital world. Despite the absence of literature in this area, there is no doubt that the sci-
entific and professional public now pay increasing attention to the concept of social responsibility 
in both concept and practice. Social responsibility has always been recognized as a significant 
means to consistently maintain and reinforce the relation between companies and society, as a way 
to promote the general welfare through virtuous and sustainable management of resources. 
Through socially responsible behavior, companies demonstrate their concerns for the community 
and the environment in their business activities and in their connection with other stakeholders 
(Andonov 2015).  
Because it can become expensive to act socially responsible, while also earning a profit, some 
companies direct their efforts toward one particular area that they consider most important or 
where they have the biggest influence or need to improve. Other companies attempt to integrate 
social responsibility in all aspects of their operation. However, if a company wants to successfully 
apply social responsibility in all aspects of its operation, it must be an integral part of the firm’s 
business values and strategic planning, the specific objectives and the basic competences of the 
company, and both the management and the employees must be devoted to it. According to Dent-
chev (2004), this includes accurate formulation of the mission and the key values of the company, 
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application of the ethical code, application of the management code, risk analysis, providing train-
ing in ethical behavior, establishing measures and preparing reports on the social, ethical, and 
ecological aspects of the business.  
Although a VC-backed entrepreneurial firm may not be this seasoned in its business practices, 
this framework still applies. A start-up firm can be considered socially responsible so long as it 
has a mission tied to its business practices that positively affect its community or society as a 
whole. A few examples include education reform, environmental sustainability, poverty allevia-
tion, or water management and conservation.  
The degree to which a firm devotes its resources and efforts to a socially responsible mission 
depends on legal requirements and pressure exerted by its stakeholders. A socially responsible 
operation and mission may provide sustainable competitive advantage, which can not only 
strengthen the company image, brand position, sales and market shares, but also reduce operational 
costs and draw a more talented and motivated work force to the business (Andonov 2015).  
Existing literature on the relation between social responsibility and the performance of a firm 
has found three disparate results: (1) negative, (2) insignificant, and (3) positive. Moskowitz 
(1972) provides an initial motivation for examining the relation between corporate social respon-
sibility and profitability. Moskowitz suggests that socially responsible firms are acceptable invest-
ment risks even though “there is at this point no real evidence that capital markets will be materi-
ally affected by social performance” (Moskowitz 1972). Moskowitz also recommends 14 firms as 
potential investments because of their social performance. However, he never reveals the specific 
criteria he uses in selecting these 14 firms. The next issue of Business and Society Review observes 
that the 14 socially responsible firms Moskowitz identified had registered a stock price increase of 
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7.28 percent over the previous six months, in contrast to a 4.4 percent rise for the Dow-Jones, a 
5.1 percent increase for the New York Stock Exchange Index, and a 6.4 percent gain for Standard 
and Poors 500 during that period. This finding has been used to support the notion that socially 
responsible firms are good investments.  
Vance (1975) challenges the findings and claims of Moskowitz. By examining the market per-
formance of Moskowitz’s original 14 recommended firms from 1972 to 1975, Vance finds that 
stock in all of the firms had declined in price and had performed far worse than the Dow-Jones, 
the New York Stock Exchange Index, and the Standard and Poors Industrials. To support his find-
ing, Vance conducted a further analysis controlling for firms’ social responsibility levels. By com-
paring the financial performance of the highest rated firms with that of the lowest rated, he finds 
that the lowest rated firms actually outperformed the highest rated firms, and he concludes that 
socially responsible firms underperform.  
Alexander and Buchholz (1978) use the betas of each firm to adjust for the sensitivity of the 
firm’s stock returns to overall market movements. They conclude that there is no significant rela-
tion between stock risk levels and the degree of social responsibility. Alexander concludes that 
“these findings suggest that the interpretations of both Moskowitz and Vance are invalid.”  
A number of different approaches to measuring a firm’s social responsibility are taken in other 
studies. Bowman and Haire (1975) identify firms as low or high in social responsibility by count-
ing the number of lines devoted to the topic in the firms’ annual reports. The authors classify 82 
firms into high, medium, and low social responsibility categories and then evaluate each category 
on the basis of a 5-year return on equity (ROE). The researchers find that the firms with medium 
ratings for degree of social responsibility perform the best and the firms with low ratings perform 
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the worst, suggesting there is a U-shaped relation between social responsibility and the perfor-
mance of a firm.  
Abbott and Monsen (1979) perform a content analysis on 28 items in firms’ Fortune 500 annual 
reports. They construct a Social Involvement Disclosure (SID) scale that they use as a proxy for 
social responsibility. By dividing 450 firms from the Fortune 500 into high and low groups on the 
basis of the scale and then examining each group for profitability, Abbott and Monsen find little 
difference in investment yield between firms in the two groups. The study concludes that investing 
in socially responsible firms is neither helpful nor harmful to investors’ returns.   
Parket and Eilbert (1975) took yet another approach. Upon contacting firms from the Forbes 
1971 Annual Directory, the researchers claim that the 96 firms that responded are more oriented 
toward social responsibility than are the nonrespondents. Parket and Eilbert then use dollar net 
income, profit margin, ROE, and earnings per share (EPS) for financial measures to compare the 
performance of the 80 allegedly socially responsible firms to the Fortune 500 firms. Results 
show that the 80 respondents who were considered to be the most socially active are more profit-
able.  
The existing literature reflects both varying methodologies and different degrees of rigor, but 
all seek to find the relation between degree of social responsibility and financial performance for 
firms. Most arguments against the conclusions from existing studies in this area have been di-
rected toward how to best capture a firm’s degree of social responsibility and financial perfor-
mance.  
8 
 
In the case of an entrepreneurial start-up firm, there are most likely no financial reports avail-
able to use for performance measures. This is even more likely in the case of a VC-backed entre-
preneurial firm because it could still be going through funding rounds, have just gone public, 
merged with another firm, been acquired by another firm, or even exited without success. While 
there is no set measure for a company’s degree of social responsibility, existing literature shows 
that there are various acceptable proxies.  
The Hypotheses 
Very little is known about the effect of having a socially responsible mission on the exit success 
of a VC-backed entrepreneurial firm. Therefore, an important question is whether such a relation 
exists. In testing for this relation, “socially responsible” is defined as operating in a clean energy 
industry, whereas a non-socially responsible venture is operating in the energy industry apart from 
the clean-energy sector. “Exit success” is defined here as it is throughout the literature: the firm is 
acquired by another (usually at a large price premium) or it is taken public in an initial public 
offering (IPO), again usually at a large premium over the initial investment price. 
The hypotheses can be stated formally as follows. 
H0: The frequency of successful exit by VC-backed clean-energy firms is no higher than for non-
clean-energy firms. 
H1: The frequency of successful exit by VC-backed clean-energy firms is higher than for non-
clean-energy firms. 
The null hypothesis states that the energy sector in which a venture operates is independent of 
its probability of successful exit. In venture capital financing, it is relatively difficult to get money 
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out of an investment because the VC-backed firms are generally private companies. When a firm 
is private, the shares cannot be sold nearly as easily as when the firm is publicly traded on a stock 
exchange, meaning the venture capitalists and entrepreneurs face a liquidity problem. In order to 
gain access, investors must “cash out” through an initial public offering (IPO) or sale of the firm 
to another company.  
An IPO is the first sale of stock by a private company to the public. A VC-backed entrepreneur-
ial firm seeking to become publicly traded and expand its capital would opt for an IPO as one way 
to exit successfully. Another route a firm could use is a merger or acquisition (M&A) with another, 
typically larger, firm. A M&A is a general term referring to the consolidation of companies. More 
specifically, a merger is a combination of two companies to form a new company, while an acqui-
sition is the purchase of one company by another in which no new company is formed. A venture 
is considered to be an unsuccessful investment if the subject company does not go public, or merge 
with or be acquired by another company. 
The alternative hypothesis is that a venture operating in a clean energy subindustry is more 
likely to have a successful exit than a venture operating in a non-clean energy subindustry. Clean 
energy ventures have a better chance of reaching success because they have a more beneficial and 
prolonged effect on the community in which it operates. The paybacks do not come strictly from 
the financial returns, but also from the environmental, social, and economic impacts the company 
exudes and continues to exude as it exists. 
A second set of hypotheses relate to how long it takes a VC investor to exit socially responsible 
firms. 
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H0: VC-backed entrepreneurial firms in a socially responsible (clean energy) sector realize no 
shorter duration to exit than firms outside the clean energy sector. 
H1: VC-backed entrepreneurial firms in a socially responsible (clean energy) sector realize a 
shorter duration to exit than firms outside the clean energy sector. 
The second null hypothesis states that the time between when a VC-backed company receives 
its first investment and when it exits is not affected by the industry in which it operates. A company 
in a clean energy industry will have the same exit duration as a company in a non-clean energy 
industry. 
The second alternative hypothesis declares that exit duration is dependent on company industry. 
It takes less time for a VC-backed firm to exit if it is in a clean energy industry. This implies that 
if a firm exits successfully, investors can earn financial returns faster when financing a clean en-
ergy venture as compared to a non-clean energy venture. 
The Data 
In order to test the hypotheses, I collect a sample of VC-backed entrepreneurial firms operating 
in the energy industry from VentureXpert, a source of data on venture capital and other early stage 
funding for companies. It contains thousands of round-level venture capital transactions for com-
panies in various industries starting in the year 1990 through the year 2014. For each investment 
transaction, there is the name of the company that is receiving it, primary industry in which the 
company operates, date in which the investment was received, total funding the company has re-
ceived to the current date, location of the company, stage the company was at when it received the 
investment, round number, round size, name of the venture capital fund that made the investment, 
and an exit date that includes whether the company went public or merged or was acquired.  
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By filtering the company primary industry to those just in the energy industries, the dataset falls 
to a total of 921 round-level transactions. Table 1 displays the primary subindustries that are clas-
sified as clean energy for the analysis: solar energy, wind energy, energy co-generation, energy 
conservation related, and alternative energy. Energy co-generation is a thermodynamically effi-
cient sustainable energy process; alternative energy is any energy source that is an alternative to 
fossil fuels. Companies in the energy related industry are classified as non-clean energy ventures 
because they fall outside the clean energy categories. 
In order to create the final sample, the round-level transactions are consolidated to company-
level transactions, meaning there is one observation per company. The company observation with 
the earliest investment received date remains and all others are dropped, producing a final sample 
of 208 observations, or companies. Approximately 95 percent of the sample is clean energy firms 
with the majority in the solar energy industry, and 5 percent is non-clean energy firms, all of which 
operate in the energy related industry. 
Preliminary findings from the sample are exhibited in Table 1. The number of observations 
refers to the number of companies in each subindustry within this sample. Solar energy holds the 
largest portion with 82 companies, whereas energy related and alternative energy subindustries 
hold the smallest portions with 11 and 9 companies, respectively. The average total funding re-
ceived is calculated by averaging the sums of all the round-level investments for each company. 
For example, a company in solar energy is estimated to receive 30.26 million dollars in funding 
over the duration of its venture capital financing. The average number of investors, average num-
ber of rounds, and average round size are all company-level metrics. Based on this sample, a solar 
energy venture can expect to receive 16.55 million dollars in each of its three rounds of financing 
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from six different investors. The number of investors financing each round is unknown. The aver-
age duration to exit is the time between when a company receives its first investment and when it 
exits. Ventures in the solar energy subindustry take approximately 5.08 years to exit. Lastly, the 
exit by IPO or trade sale indicates the total number of companies that have exited in these ways. 
TABLE 1 
Summary Statistics of VC Industry Type 
VC Industry Type 
Number 
of Ob-
serva-
tions 
Average 
Total 
Funding 
Received 
(millions) 
Average 
Number 
of Inves-
tors 
Average 
Number 
of 
Rounds 
Aver-
age 
Round 
Size 
Aver-
age 
Exit 
Dura-
tion 
(years) 
Exit by 
IPO or 
Trade 
Sale 
Clean Energy 197 $30.26 6 3 $16.55 5.08 25 
   Solar Energy 82 52.33 9 3 31.21 5.18 13 
   Wind Energy 34 25.16 8 4 20.21 4.21 6 
   Energy Co-Generation 42 54.33 4 3 15.89 10.02 2 
   Energy Conservation Related 30 13.89 7 3 8.64 4.31 2 
   Alternative Energy 9 5.58 4 2 5.81 1.69 2 
Non-Clean Energy 11 $20.68 5 3 $6.42 5.91 2 
   Energy Related 11 20.68 5 3 6.42 5.91 2 
t-test p-value   0.22 0.28 0.00*** 0.09* 0.26 0.00*** 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  **Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
The p-value represents the significance of the difference between clean and non-clean en-
ergy means. The metrics from Table 1 indicate that on average, clean energy firms have more 
investors involved, receive more total funding, and have larger round sizes than do non-clean en-
ergy firms. However, only the differences between round sizes and number of IPOs and trade sales 
are significant. Before conducting any regression analyses, researchers can reason that clean en-
ergy ventures dominate the energy sector because more investors are involved and more funding 
is devoted to them. On the other hand, these findings can suggest that clean energy ventures require 
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more investors, larger rounds, and more total funding than non-clean energy ventures do to be 
successful or even unsuccessful. The regression analyses will provide further insight to these ar-
guments. 
The Variables 
In what follows, the main variables are described and defined. Table 2 displays the descriptive 
statistics. 
TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
Number of 
Observations Mean Min Max 
Success 208 0.115   
Clean 208 0.947   
Solar Energy 208 0.394   
Wind Energy 208 0.163   
Alternative Energy 208 0.043   
Energy Conservation Related 208 0.144   
Energy Co-Generation 208 0.202   
Energy Related 208 0.053   
Early Stage 208 0.279   
Seed Stage 208 0.159   
Expansion Stage 208 0.221   
Later Stage 208 0.063   
Location 208 0.264   
Log Number of Rounds 208 2.197 1.503 2.443 
Log Round Size (millions) 156 1.847 -2.352 7.269 
Log Number of Investors in Company 206 1.702 1.000 4.135 
Log Total Financing in Company (millions) 161 2.970 -1.996 7.350 
 
Success is a binary dummy variable used to value a venture’s way of exit. As explained before, 
the success of a new venture is hard to measure because there are often no financial statements, no 
share prices, and virtually no useful public information in existence.  For the purposes of this 
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analysis, a venture that exits by IPO or M&A takes the value 1 noting a successful exit, whereas a 
company that fails to exit or exits with no result takes the value 0. 
Clean is another binary dummy variable used as a proxy for social responsibility. By distin-
guishing clean energy ventures from non-clean energy ventures, the analysis can yield results to 
which one is more successful. Solar energy, wind energy, alternative energy, energy conservation 
related, and energy co-generation subindustries take the value 1 and those in the energy related 
subindustry take the value 0. For further analysis, binary dummy variables are created for each of 
the six subindustries: solar energy, wind energy, alternative energy, energy conservation related, 
energy co-generation, and energy related. 
There are four main stages in venture capital financing. The earliest stage is the seed stage. A 
company in this stage has usually not yet established a continuous stream of cash to fund research 
and product development. This can make companies in the seed stage quite difficult business op-
portunities for investors, hence why outside investors do not usually come in until the early stage. 
A company that has been in business for a short time, but has not yet put its product in the mar-
ketplace is considered to be in the early stage. This stage can become very expensive for venture 
capital funds because new businesses can consume vast amounts of cash quickly. Once the venture 
exhibits substantial growth, it begins to receive venture capital funding to add fuel to the fire; it is 
in the expansion stage, a stage for enabling expansion to additional markets and the diversification 
and differentiation of product lines. Post expansion stage is the later stage, a stage when companies 
are seeking pathways to public markets. If all goes well, the company can IPO or M&A, and the 
investors may sell their shares and end their engagements with the company. All four stages of 
venture capital financing serve as binary dummy variables in this study. It can be concluded from 
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Table 2 that most of the ventures in this sample are in the early stage because it exhibits the largest 
mean value amongst all other stages.  
The last binary dummy variable used in the regression analyses is location. For the purpose of 
this study, the variable takes the value 1 if the company operates in California, 0 otherwise. The 
state of California is home to Silicon Valley, a portion of the San Francisco Bay Area known for 
its thousands of startup companies. It accounts for one-third of all of the venture capital investment 
in the United States and is therefore tested for its significance in the success of this sample’s ven-
tures.   
Log number of rounds is the logarithm of the total number of rounds each company received 
financing.  
Log round size is the logarithm of the average round size across all rounds for the company. 
Log number of investors in company is the logarithm of the total number of venture capital 
funds that have invested in the company. 
Log total financing in company is the logarithm of the total amount of funding the company has 
received thus far.  
Results 
Does clean energy affect the probability of success for a venture? 
 
As noted, the first null hypothesis is tested using a probit model. Table 3 shows the results. 
 
The probit regression yielded no significant result between the dependent and independent var-
iable. Since the p-value of the clean marginal increase in probability is greater than 0.10, the null 
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hypothesis cannot be rejected. Therefore, this analysis concludes that there is no relationship be-
tween the success of a venture and whether it operates in the clean energy industry or not. Whether 
the company functions in California or elsewhere is also of no significance. 
TABLE 3 
Determinants of Venture Capital Success, As Measured By IPO and M&A 
Dependent variable: success 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Marginal increase in 
probability 
Clean 0.021 0.107 
 (0.97)  
Log Number of Investors in Company 0.196 0.034 
 (0.32)  
Log Total Financing in Company (millions) 0.018 0.016 
 (0.84)  
Early Stage 0.749** 0.062 
 (0.05)  
Expansion Stage 1.005** 0.065 
 (0.03)  
Later Stage 0.879* 0.097 
 (0.08)  
Location -0.103 0.054 
 (0.74)  
Number of companies = 159 Pseudo R2 = 0.080 
The table presents results of a probit. 
p-value in parentheses. 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  **Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
However, it did suggest that there is some significance between the stage a company is in when 
it receives its first investment and its ability to IPO or M&A. One would think that if a company 
was in the later stages of venture capital financing that it would have a higher probability of reach-
ing success, but these results beg to differ. Companies in both the early and expansion stages 
demonstrate a greater chance of exiting successfully at the five percent significance level; compa-
nies in the later stage show a greater chance of exiting successfully at the ten percent significance 
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level. This implies that investors should get involved with premature ventures because they have 
a better chance of receiving a financial return. 
 
Does the type of clean energy subindustry affect the probability of success for a venture?  
 
The regression yields no significant results when all clean energy subindustries are aggre-
gated into one clean energy industry variable. However, this is not the case when the subindustries 
are regressed individually against the control variables. Table 3.1 presents findings from the sec-
ond regression.  
TABLE 3.1 
Determinants of Venture Capital Success, As Measured By IPO and M&A 
Dependent variable: success 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Marginal increase in 
probability 
Solar Energy 0.644* 0.059* 
 (0.09)  
Wind Energy 0.297 0.070 
 (0.50)  
Alternative Energy 1.027* 0.101* 
 (0.10)  
Log Number of Investors in Company 0.131 0.034 
 (0.53)  
Log Total Financing in Company (millions) 0.051 0.015 
 (0.60)  
Early Stage 0.745* 0.059* 
 (0.06)  
Expansion Stage 0.856** 0.063** 
 (0.04)  
Later Stage 1.082* 0.094* 
 (0.07)  
Location -0.259 0.056 
 (0.45)  
Number of companies = 159 Pseudo R2 = 0.118 
The table presents results of a probit. 
p-value in parentheses. 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  **Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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VC-backed firms in both solar and alternative energy subindustries demonstrate a higher 
probability of success at the ten percent significance level than do non-clean energy firms. For 
each new solar energy venture, chances of it exiting by IPO or trade sale increase by approximately 
5.9 percent. For each new alternative energy venture, chances of it exiting by IPO or trade sale 
increase by about 10.1 percent. These odds provide evidence against the null hypothesis and in 
support of the alternative hypothesis. Investing in clean energy is not always an automatic loss like 
most investors think. In fact, according to these results investors have a greater chance of earning 
profits by financing clean energy ventures than they do financing non-clean energy ventures.  
TABLE 4 
Determinants of Venture Capital Duration to Exit 
Dependent variable: log exit duration 
 (1) (2) 
Independent variables Coefficients Coefficients 
Clean -0.398  
 (0.68)  
Solar Energy  -0.824* 
  (0.06) 
Wind Energy  0.638 
  (0.30) 
Alternative Energy  -1.766*** 
  (0.01) 
Log Number of Investors in Company 0.647* 1.262*** 
 (0.08) (0.00) 
Log Total Financing in Company (millions) -0.057 -0.285* 
 (0.73) (0.07) 
Stage dummies included included 
   
Location dummy included included 
   
   
Number of companies = 19 Adj R2 = 0.195 Adj R2 = 0.692 
The table presents results of an OLS regression. 
p-value in parentheses. 
***Significant at the 0.01 level. 
  **Significant at the 0.05 level. 
    *Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Do clean energy ventures realize a shorter duration to exit? 
Solar and alternative energies reveal a greater probability of success as compared to non-
clean energies, but is it taking them longer to exit? Using the log of exit duration for the dependent 
variable and the clean energy subindustries for the independent variables, the results displayed in 
Table 4 are obtained. 
 
The direction of the coefficients on the solar and alternative subindustry variables represent 
a negative relation to the exit duration variable. This means that ventures in alternative and solar 
energy subindustries exit significantly faster than other ventures, 1.77 and 0.82 years faster, re-
spectively. Since the coefficients are significant at the ten and one percent levels, the null hypoth-
esis is rejected. Investors not only have a greater chance of success when investing in clean energy, 
they also obtain that success faster.  
Conclusions 
This study presents two findings to fill the gap in literature regarding social responsibility 
and VC-backed entrepreneurial firms. Significant results are observed for an analysis of 208 en-
ergy companies from the VentureXpert data base. Among those 208 companies, 197 are classi-
fied as socially responsible and 11 are classified as “not socially responsible.” Because of the 
small sample size for the latter group, results should be interpreted with care. However, they 
likely still have some insight to offer.  
 The results show that clean-energy ventures are more likely to achieve success through 
an IPO or trade sale than are non-clean energy ventures. Thus, there is no evidence that VC in-
vestors should shun socially responsible firms operating in solar and alternative subindustries.  
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 The second conclusion is that not only do socially responsible VC-backed entrepreneurial 
firms exit with greater success, they also exit faster than do non-socially responsible firms. This 
combination would be considered is a twofold victory for venture capitalists.  
 This study provides a starting point for future empirical work regarding venture capital 
investing in socially responsible firms. Work such as this is important as businesses and society 
grapple with the question of how to move toward more sustainable industrial activities. 
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